President Obama, in attempting to curry favor with the Republican bloc, has made his own party just a tad angry. The President finally reached some sort of compromise with the Republicans on the issue of tax cuts. To give you the short story- they're being extended. Again. And economists are predicting we'll be $900 billion deeper into our deficit before they expire again.
Of course, the one thing everybody is forgetting is that, if we didn't have so much darn spending on our plate, to the tune of some 3,500 billion, we might not have to levy so many taxes. But since that logic is soooo fourth grade, we're not going to go that route. No siree. It's so much more fun to dig ourselves deeper into debt, but hey, at least we'll be happy while we do it! Sort of.
On another note, I thought I'd say something about the drama surrounding the Wikileaks fiasco.
Heh. I find it ridiculous, the furor that's arising over all this. Our government is paralyzed with fear that, horror of horrors, we'll figure out what backroom deals they've been negotiating, where our money is being sent, and what they've been doing in other countries all these years.
In any case, I don't understand why some people are calling for Assange to be either thrown in jail to rot for all eternity, or, alternately, to be hunted down like an al Qaeda operative. Meh. If we're going to hunt him down like we do the leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban, Mrs. Palin, he's quite safe. Trust me on this one. Of course, if we're going to hunt down Assange that way, then it would also make sense to hunt down some New York Times writer or editor or somebody. Yes, indeed.
In any case, I think much of the blustering is just attempted distraction. Our government doesn't want the rest of the world to suddenly realize that we've been total junior-highers and have been saying bad things about them behind their backs, not to mention trying to pull all sorts of shenanigans. That would be bad. v.v
Showing posts with label United states. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United states. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Short-Term Memory Loss
You remember Dory, the little blue fish in the Disney-Pixar film Finding Nemo? According to her, she suffers from short-term memory loss- an unfortunate predicament that leads to some very interesting plot twists along the journey she takes with the clownfish, Marlin.Anyway. Hilarious fish aside, I am of the opinion that Americans suffer from a bad case of short-term memory loss. Why?
Maybe it's because American Conservatives seem dead-set on forgetting that their golden boy, George Bush, began the bailouts back in '08. Maybe because liberals consistently forget that they hated the wars not so long ago. Maybe because conservatives also always forget that not too long ago they were marked as possible terrorists...and then cheer on the deliberate expatriation of terrorists and the stripping of Constitutional rights from them.
Maybe all of that...
There's a video my mom found during the '08 election cycle. It featured parodies of George Bush and Clinton, with a "baby" John McCain and Obama, and Bush and Clinton were giving their two prodigies political advice. At one part in the song, they are singing about how their political plans are failing, people are getting upset...
"But if efforts at deflection aren't succeeding/And you feel that your career is on the brink/you've one trump card to play before conceding/As the details of your scandal become more than they can handle/They will surely seek relief and with memories oh so brief/With but one cycle of the news they'll find trivia to amuse/*gasp* Brittney's back in rehab!"
Yes folks, that is exactly what America is like. And this is what we're doing to ourselves.
Welcome to the world of one-week attention spans.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Independence Day
Happy Independence Day everyone. Let me share a quote someone wrote on Facebook:
"July 4th is not Military Day - it is Independence Day. It's purpose is to commemorate NOT government, NOT Government troops, NOT war, but FREEDOM from the above. July 4th is about SECESSION from oppressive governments." -- Joshua Joscelyn
I liked it. :)) But anyway. Today we get free food (fun times), and tonight I should be able to construct a post of some fashion because I saw a news story that actually interested me. :)) So expect to see a post or two up tonight, and then hopefully I get back into the swing of things!
Until then, I hope everyone has a safe and happy 4th of July, and that you all stay safe and don't get hit by a falling firework. Have a nice day. :P :))
"July 4th is not Military Day - it is Independence Day. It's purpose is to commemorate NOT government, NOT Government troops, NOT war, but FREEDOM from the above. July 4th is about SECESSION from oppressive governments." -- Joshua Joscelyn
I liked it. :)) But anyway. Today we get free food (fun times), and tonight I should be able to construct a post of some fashion because I saw a news story that actually interested me. :)) So expect to see a post or two up tonight, and then hopefully I get back into the swing of things!
Until then, I hope everyone has a safe and happy 4th of July, and that you all stay safe and don't get hit by a falling firework. Have a nice day. :P :))
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Planning for the Next War
How to Fight a Better War (Next Time)
Three Fixes for the American Way of War
By Tom Engelhardt
Iraq remains a mess from which the U.S. military seems increasingly uninterested in withdrawing fully and Afghanistan a disaster area, but it’s never too soon to think about the next war. The subject is already on the minds of Pentagon planners. The question is: Are they focusing on how to manage future wars so that they won’t last longer than the American Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II combined?
There’s reason to worry, especially since the lessons of both Iraq and Afghanistan are clear: it takes years after a war has been launched for the U.S. military to develop tactics that lead to stasis. (“Victory” is a word that has gone out of fashion.)
Here, then, are three modest suggestions for recalibrating the American way of war. All are based on a simple principle -- “preventive war planning” -- and are focused on getting the next war right before it begins, not decades after it’s launched.
1. Make the Apologies in Advance
Who can doubt that the American way of war has undergone changes since, in December 2001, a B-52 and two B-1B bombers using precision-guided weapons essentially wiped out a village celebrating a wedding in Eastern Afghanistan? Of 112 Afghans in that wedding party, only two women survived. Similarly, in August 2008, in the village of Azizabad in Herat Province, at least 90 Afghans, including 60 children, were killed in a series of U.S. air strikes, while in May 2009, up to 140 Afghan civilians died in a U.S. bombing attack in Farah Province.
Understandably, such “incidents” have done little to endear the U.S. and its allies to Afghans. Until recently, the U.S. military would initially deny that civilians had even died; if the incident refused to go away, military spokespeople would then admit to small numbers of civilian deaths (often blamed on the Taliban), while launching an “investigation” and waiting for the hubbub to die away. Apologies or “regrets” came late and grudgingly, if at all (along with modest payments to the relatives of the dead). Back then, being American and at war in distant lands meant never having to say you were sorry.
More recently, Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal has changed the rules, curbing air strikes (though not drone strikes), warning his troops to prevent civilian deaths, and instituting an instant expression of “regrets” for such deaths. One thing, however, has changed only marginally: the civilian deaths themselves.
In mid-February, for instance, 12 civilians died when two U.S. rockets slammed into a compound near the city of Marja in Helmand Province. The following day, five Afghan civilians digging at the side of a road in Kandahar Province were killed in an air strike after being mistaken for insurgents planting a roadside bomb. Then, in Uruzgan Province, U.S. Special Forces troops in helicopters struck a convoy of mini-buses, killing up to 27 civilians, including women and children.
After each of these incidents, regrets were quickly expressed, investigations launched. In the case of the mini-buses, McChrystal apologized to Afghan President Hamid Karzai personally and then went on Afghan television to make his apology public. (“I pledge to strengthen our efforts to regain your trust to build a brighter future for all Afghans. Most importantly, I express my deepest, heartfelt condolences to the victims and their families. We all share in their grief and will keep them in our thoughts and prayers.”)
Unfortunately, a policy of repeated apology is unlikely to prove much more successful than the previous stonewalling tactic as long as civilians die, which they will, given the American style of war. It may be too late to correct this in Afghanistan, but the next war is another story. My suggestion is simple: in the future, the U.S. military should issue a blanket apology before going to war, and the first waves of U.S. planes should not drop bombs but abjectly worded leaflets. These would take responsibility in advance for future civilian deaths and pre-apologize for them.
There is a partial precedent for this. In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, American planes regularly dropped leaflets warning peasant farmers that they were living in “free fire zones” and should beware or move out. In this case, the pamphlets would make clear that the United States is going after “the evil-doers” and admit that, despite our ever more precise weaponry, we will unfortunately kill a certain percentage of you in the process. (“The U.S. military expresses our deepest, heartfelt condolences to the future victims and their families. We will all share in their grief and, when they die, will keep them in our thoughts and prayers.”) We should also announce in advance at least a $1,500 solatium payment for any relative, spouse, or child who perishes, as well as carefully calibrated sums for the loss of limbs, eyes, and the like.
After this, whenever civilians die, the military would simply refer interested parties to the prewar statement. This should guarantee a cleaner, more effective way of war.
2. Pre-Build the Bases, Prisons, and Embassy Complexes
Thanks to nine years in Afghanistan and seven in Iraq, it’s easier to grasp how the American way of war actually works. A striking (if little discussed) aspect of it is the base-building that accompanies it. In the years of fighting, the Pentagon built several hundred bases in each country, ranging from tiny outposts to massive American “towns.” It also constructed multiple prisons and holding centers (some secret), and for each war, a nearly billion-dollar regional command center, which we still inaccurately call an “embassy.” The one in Islamabad, Pakistan, is only now under construction.
Much of this was done on the fly and in response to events. For the next war, it would be more logical to prepare in advance. Again, there is a partial precedent. In recent years, the U.S. has pre-positioned equipment at small bases and other locations around the world, so that, should a sudden desire to intervene arise, the means are relatively close at hand. This strategy should be significantly expanded. The Pentagon and the U.S. Intelligence Community could agree on the four most likely places for future interventions. Say, Yemen, Colombia, Nigeria, and Kyrgyzstan, and start laying the groundwork now.
The usual private contractors -- Fluor, DynCorp, and KBR -- should be rounded up to build the necessary 1,400 bases and accompanying prisons under a global multi-billion dollar LOGCAP contract to be divided among them. At the same time, the State Department would put those future mega-embassies out for bid to U.S. architectural firms so that the now-typical fortress-like designs (with their near-billion-dollar price tags) would be ready to go.
With full-scale base-prison-embassy complexes ready in four strategically located regions, future invasions would have a reasonable shot at not dragging out for decades.
3. Pick the Right Natives
It’s noticeable that the U.S. military always seems to get stuck with the wrong natives. Take the current campaign in Marja:
Afghan National Army (ANA) troops are regularly described as unable to read maps, incapable of “planning a complicated patrol” or resupplying themselves, poor at small unit maneuvering, poorly trained, refusing to stand night guard duty and sometimes even to fight, high on drugs, riddled with corruption, unable to aim their weapons, “years away from functioning effectively on their own,” and as C.J. Chivers of the New York Times recently summed matters up, totally inadequate when it comes to “transporting troops, directing them in battle and coordinating fire support [or] arranging modern communications, logistics, aviation and medical support.” And keep in mind that the soldiers sent into Marja are reportedly the best the ANA has available. All this, despite multi-billions of dollars and years of effort invested in Afghan army training. (And the Afghan police, for multi-billions more, make the Afghan army look good.)
On the other hand, perhaps a few hundred Taliban fighters stayed in Marja and fought. Descriptions of them invariably reflect grudging admiration. They are considered capable of planning and executing complex small-unit maneuvers as well as “sustained and complex attacks,” of resupplying themselves, of “surprisingly accurate” sniper fire, and of not being corrupt. In Marja, it was repeatedly said that “outnumbered and outgunned” Taliban fighters were “mounting a tougher fight than expected” or engaging in “determined resistance,” that they represented, in the words of Centcom commander General David Petraeus, a “formidable” force.
For those old enough to remember the Vietnam War, you could replace such descriptions of “our” Afghans with “our” Vietnamese and “their” Afghans with “their” Vietnamese without breaking stride. One explanation for this is that indigenous people react differently when fighting a foreign occupying force rather than aiding it. However, as U.S. forces are incapable of occupying a country thanks to our exceptionally good intentions (of which we are well aware), another explanation makes better sense: In the kinds of countries we’re likely to invade, there are evidently two races (or the equivalent) of natives -- think of them as like the Eloi and the Morlocks in H.G. Wells’s novel The Time Machine -- and we always pick the wrong one.
So before the next invasion, we should make use of small teams of anthropologists and social scientists from the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System, already trained to help the military with local cultural problems. They should be inserted in the country or region in question to identify which natives are best suited for learning small-unit maneuvering and the other skills over which the enemy always seems to have such a monopoly.
Of course, a fourth planning possibility would involve not launching such wars in the first place. But that path would conflict with a basic American can-do spirit that this country prizes, so suggestions 1 through 3 are undoubtedly a more practical way to proceed.
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book, The American Way of War (Haymarket Books), will be published in May. Catch the latest TomCast, TomDispatch.com’s audio interview with Tom Engelhardt on the American state of perpetual war, by clicking here, or download the podcast by clicking here.
Copyright 2010 Tom Engelhardt
Three Fixes for the American Way of War
By Tom Engelhardt
Iraq remains a mess from which the U.S. military seems increasingly uninterested in withdrawing fully and Afghanistan a disaster area, but it’s never too soon to think about the next war. The subject is already on the minds of Pentagon planners. The question is: Are they focusing on how to manage future wars so that they won’t last longer than the American Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II combined?
There’s reason to worry, especially since the lessons of both Iraq and Afghanistan are clear: it takes years after a war has been launched for the U.S. military to develop tactics that lead to stasis. (“Victory” is a word that has gone out of fashion.)
Here, then, are three modest suggestions for recalibrating the American way of war. All are based on a simple principle -- “preventive war planning” -- and are focused on getting the next war right before it begins, not decades after it’s launched.
1. Make the Apologies in Advance
Who can doubt that the American way of war has undergone changes since, in December 2001, a B-52 and two B-1B bombers using precision-guided weapons essentially wiped out a village celebrating a wedding in Eastern Afghanistan? Of 112 Afghans in that wedding party, only two women survived. Similarly, in August 2008, in the village of Azizabad in Herat Province, at least 90 Afghans, including 60 children, were killed in a series of U.S. air strikes, while in May 2009, up to 140 Afghan civilians died in a U.S. bombing attack in Farah Province.
Understandably, such “incidents” have done little to endear the U.S. and its allies to Afghans. Until recently, the U.S. military would initially deny that civilians had even died; if the incident refused to go away, military spokespeople would then admit to small numbers of civilian deaths (often blamed on the Taliban), while launching an “investigation” and waiting for the hubbub to die away. Apologies or “regrets” came late and grudgingly, if at all (along with modest payments to the relatives of the dead). Back then, being American and at war in distant lands meant never having to say you were sorry.
More recently, Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal has changed the rules, curbing air strikes (though not drone strikes), warning his troops to prevent civilian deaths, and instituting an instant expression of “regrets” for such deaths. One thing, however, has changed only marginally: the civilian deaths themselves.
In mid-February, for instance, 12 civilians died when two U.S. rockets slammed into a compound near the city of Marja in Helmand Province. The following day, five Afghan civilians digging at the side of a road in Kandahar Province were killed in an air strike after being mistaken for insurgents planting a roadside bomb. Then, in Uruzgan Province, U.S. Special Forces troops in helicopters struck a convoy of mini-buses, killing up to 27 civilians, including women and children.
After each of these incidents, regrets were quickly expressed, investigations launched. In the case of the mini-buses, McChrystal apologized to Afghan President Hamid Karzai personally and then went on Afghan television to make his apology public. (“I pledge to strengthen our efforts to regain your trust to build a brighter future for all Afghans. Most importantly, I express my deepest, heartfelt condolences to the victims and their families. We all share in their grief and will keep them in our thoughts and prayers.”)
Unfortunately, a policy of repeated apology is unlikely to prove much more successful than the previous stonewalling tactic as long as civilians die, which they will, given the American style of war. It may be too late to correct this in Afghanistan, but the next war is another story. My suggestion is simple: in the future, the U.S. military should issue a blanket apology before going to war, and the first waves of U.S. planes should not drop bombs but abjectly worded leaflets. These would take responsibility in advance for future civilian deaths and pre-apologize for them.
There is a partial precedent for this. In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, American planes regularly dropped leaflets warning peasant farmers that they were living in “free fire zones” and should beware or move out. In this case, the pamphlets would make clear that the United States is going after “the evil-doers” and admit that, despite our ever more precise weaponry, we will unfortunately kill a certain percentage of you in the process. (“The U.S. military expresses our deepest, heartfelt condolences to the future victims and their families. We will all share in their grief and, when they die, will keep them in our thoughts and prayers.”) We should also announce in advance at least a $1,500 solatium payment for any relative, spouse, or child who perishes, as well as carefully calibrated sums for the loss of limbs, eyes, and the like.
After this, whenever civilians die, the military would simply refer interested parties to the prewar statement. This should guarantee a cleaner, more effective way of war.
2. Pre-Build the Bases, Prisons, and Embassy Complexes
Thanks to nine years in Afghanistan and seven in Iraq, it’s easier to grasp how the American way of war actually works. A striking (if little discussed) aspect of it is the base-building that accompanies it. In the years of fighting, the Pentagon built several hundred bases in each country, ranging from tiny outposts to massive American “towns.” It also constructed multiple prisons and holding centers (some secret), and for each war, a nearly billion-dollar regional command center, which we still inaccurately call an “embassy.” The one in Islamabad, Pakistan, is only now under construction.
Much of this was done on the fly and in response to events. For the next war, it would be more logical to prepare in advance. Again, there is a partial precedent. In recent years, the U.S. has pre-positioned equipment at small bases and other locations around the world, so that, should a sudden desire to intervene arise, the means are relatively close at hand. This strategy should be significantly expanded. The Pentagon and the U.S. Intelligence Community could agree on the four most likely places for future interventions. Say, Yemen, Colombia, Nigeria, and Kyrgyzstan, and start laying the groundwork now.
The usual private contractors -- Fluor, DynCorp, and KBR -- should be rounded up to build the necessary 1,400 bases and accompanying prisons under a global multi-billion dollar LOGCAP contract to be divided among them. At the same time, the State Department would put those future mega-embassies out for bid to U.S. architectural firms so that the now-typical fortress-like designs (with their near-billion-dollar price tags) would be ready to go.
With full-scale base-prison-embassy complexes ready in four strategically located regions, future invasions would have a reasonable shot at not dragging out for decades.
3. Pick the Right Natives
It’s noticeable that the U.S. military always seems to get stuck with the wrong natives. Take the current campaign in Marja:
Afghan National Army (ANA) troops are regularly described as unable to read maps, incapable of “planning a complicated patrol” or resupplying themselves, poor at small unit maneuvering, poorly trained, refusing to stand night guard duty and sometimes even to fight, high on drugs, riddled with corruption, unable to aim their weapons, “years away from functioning effectively on their own,” and as C.J. Chivers of the New York Times recently summed matters up, totally inadequate when it comes to “transporting troops, directing them in battle and coordinating fire support [or] arranging modern communications, logistics, aviation and medical support.” And keep in mind that the soldiers sent into Marja are reportedly the best the ANA has available. All this, despite multi-billions of dollars and years of effort invested in Afghan army training. (And the Afghan police, for multi-billions more, make the Afghan army look good.)
On the other hand, perhaps a few hundred Taliban fighters stayed in Marja and fought. Descriptions of them invariably reflect grudging admiration. They are considered capable of planning and executing complex small-unit maneuvers as well as “sustained and complex attacks,” of resupplying themselves, of “surprisingly accurate” sniper fire, and of not being corrupt. In Marja, it was repeatedly said that “outnumbered and outgunned” Taliban fighters were “mounting a tougher fight than expected” or engaging in “determined resistance,” that they represented, in the words of Centcom commander General David Petraeus, a “formidable” force.
For those old enough to remember the Vietnam War, you could replace such descriptions of “our” Afghans with “our” Vietnamese and “their” Afghans with “their” Vietnamese without breaking stride. One explanation for this is that indigenous people react differently when fighting a foreign occupying force rather than aiding it. However, as U.S. forces are incapable of occupying a country thanks to our exceptionally good intentions (of which we are well aware), another explanation makes better sense: In the kinds of countries we’re likely to invade, there are evidently two races (or the equivalent) of natives -- think of them as like the Eloi and the Morlocks in H.G. Wells’s novel The Time Machine -- and we always pick the wrong one.
So before the next invasion, we should make use of small teams of anthropologists and social scientists from the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System, already trained to help the military with local cultural problems. They should be inserted in the country or region in question to identify which natives are best suited for learning small-unit maneuvering and the other skills over which the enemy always seems to have such a monopoly.
Of course, a fourth planning possibility would involve not launching such wars in the first place. But that path would conflict with a basic American can-do spirit that this country prizes, so suggestions 1 through 3 are undoubtedly a more practical way to proceed.
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book, The American Way of War (Haymarket Books), will be published in May. Catch the latest TomCast, TomDispatch.com’s audio interview with Tom Engelhardt on the American state of perpetual war, by clicking here, or download the podcast by clicking here.
Copyright 2010 Tom Engelhardt
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Blind Followers
I will never cease to be amazed by the stunning lack of introspection among Americans. It would be hilarious if it weren't so utterly sickening. All too often, I see people make comments that show that they really don't know what they're talking about. That, or they just haven't thought about it enough to actually hear what they're saying.
Come on. Who in their right mind would seriously advocate the nuking and killing of millions of innocent civilians? Yet we hear that all the time, both from ordinary Americans, commentators (mostly on Fox News) and even some of our elected officials. They seem to think, through some mysterious logical process, if we kill millions of people, our image among the collective world would improve, everyone would love us, and all our problems would be solved.
Then there's the near-mantra of the left- if we just get the government involved, everything will be fine. (Of course, Republicans also do this, but the left is a far more vocal proponent, mostly because they'll get reelected for it. Republicans won't.) Somehow, if we only had more Federal control over local life, the country would come back from the brink, we'd all be prosperous, and America would once again be all peachy keen.
And Americans are only too willing to continue to fall prey to rhetoric of that sort. What I don't understand is why. Why do we so willingly follow those we shouldn't trust- the politicians- and eat up their rhetoric as if it were the best thing we'd ever heard?
Come on. Who in their right mind would seriously advocate the nuking and killing of millions of innocent civilians? Yet we hear that all the time, both from ordinary Americans, commentators (mostly on Fox News) and even some of our elected officials. They seem to think, through some mysterious logical process, if we kill millions of people, our image among the collective world would improve, everyone would love us, and all our problems would be solved.
Then there's the near-mantra of the left- if we just get the government involved, everything will be fine. (Of course, Republicans also do this, but the left is a far more vocal proponent, mostly because they'll get reelected for it. Republicans won't.) Somehow, if we only had more Federal control over local life, the country would come back from the brink, we'd all be prosperous, and America would once again be all peachy keen.
And Americans are only too willing to continue to fall prey to rhetoric of that sort. What I don't understand is why. Why do we so willingly follow those we shouldn't trust- the politicians- and eat up their rhetoric as if it were the best thing we'd ever heard?
Sunday, December 13, 2009
Patriotism
I was thinking about this the other day. Okay, I admit- my thoughts were provoked by three things. 1) a bunch of American flags fluttering outside someone's house, 2) a bunch of yellow ribbons tied around trees, and 3) two American flags on the back of someone's motorcycle. Don't ask me why he needed two. I have no idea.
Anyway. My question is this- what is patriotism? What comprises patriotism?
I don't think patriotism includes blindly following a certain party because they profess to be 'American'. Nor is patriotism hanging an American flag outside your house. Nor is patriotism merely acceding to the demands of our politicians, or accepting what they do. Neither, in my opinion, is patriotism agreeing with a war merely because we're fighting it.
Some of those reasons are misguided. Some are silly. And some are just...well, lemming-ish.
When we think patriotism is based on what party we are a part of, we're really just giving in to pride about how smart we are. Patriotism is not based on your beliefs. Patriotism is also not based on a show in front of your house, either of American flags or little yellow ribbons. That leads into the war thing.
Just because we're fighting a war, doesn't mean you have to support it. And just because you don't support it doesn't make you less American. It makes you critical, but not un-American. Patriotism is also not just submitting to what our politicians do. We are the bosses of our politicians, and as such we should be active.
And that is what I think patriotism is- having a healthy, yet critical, love for your country, but not one that amounts to fanaticism. We do not want American fanatics. Patriotism is being able to acknowledge that your country has faults, but being willing to do something about those faults.
Anyway. My question is this- what is patriotism? What comprises patriotism?
I don't think patriotism includes blindly following a certain party because they profess to be 'American'. Nor is patriotism hanging an American flag outside your house. Nor is patriotism merely acceding to the demands of our politicians, or accepting what they do. Neither, in my opinion, is patriotism agreeing with a war merely because we're fighting it.
Some of those reasons are misguided. Some are silly. And some are just...well, lemming-ish.
When we think patriotism is based on what party we are a part of, we're really just giving in to pride about how smart we are. Patriotism is not based on your beliefs. Patriotism is also not based on a show in front of your house, either of American flags or little yellow ribbons. That leads into the war thing.
Just because we're fighting a war, doesn't mean you have to support it. And just because you don't support it doesn't make you less American. It makes you critical, but not un-American. Patriotism is also not just submitting to what our politicians do. We are the bosses of our politicians, and as such we should be active.
And that is what I think patriotism is- having a healthy, yet critical, love for your country, but not one that amounts to fanaticism. We do not want American fanatics. Patriotism is being able to acknowledge that your country has faults, but being willing to do something about those faults.
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